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Abstract
Traditionally crowdfunding has been used for funding very innovative
projects. Recently, however, companies have begun using crowdfunding
to nance more traditional products where they compete against other
sellers of similar products. One of the major platforms Indiegogo launched
several projects consistent with this trend. This paper o¤ers a model of
a duopoly where rms can use crowdfunding prior to direct sales. The
model is based on asymmetric information between competitors regarding
the demand for the product. It provides several implications that have
not yet been tested. For example we nd that high-demand rms can use
crowdfunding to signal their quality.
Keywords: crowdfunding, asymmetric information, reward-based crowd-
funding, duopoly, signalling
JEL Codes: D43, D82, G32, L11, L26, M13
1 Introduction
Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a start-up company or project by rais-
ing funds from a large number of people. It is usually performed online. When
talking about crowdfunding the media and internet usually provide examples of
rms that use it for funding extremely innovative and often very sosticated
Apple-esque1 products.2 Examples include 3D-printers, electric cars, smart
watches etc.3 In this case rms retain monopoly power during the stage of
development and sales of the project.4 Less attention is paid to companies that
Birmingham City University, anton.miglo@bcu.ac.uk, Department of Finance, Accoun-
tancy and Economics, Birmingham, UK.
1https://artofthekickstart.com/kickstarter-vs-indiegogo-and-how-to-decide-for-your-
crowdfunding-campaign/
2See, for example, Kumar et al (2015).
3https://3dprint.com/188971/cubibot-3d-printer-kickstarter/
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/30/pebble-watch-funding-hits-record.html
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/02/96351-pod-point-launches-third-equity-
crowdfunding-campaign-crowdcube/
4See, for example, Santos (2017).
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use crowdfunding for nancing more traditional products and services. Exam-
ples of products include handbags, perfumes, toys etc.5 In this case the level
of competition with producers of similar products increases. One of the major
crowdfunding website platforms, Indiegogo, is an open platform and can be used
by any company for any product.6 It also launched several strategic projects in
2017-2018 consistent with the trend described above. For example, it introduced
Indiegogo Marketplace where rms sell their products initially nanced through
crowdfunding and compete against other rms which may not have necessarily
used crowdfunding to launch their products.7 Australian farmers seem to have
started using crowdfunding for improving traditional market structures such as
duopolies (which are often the case).8
Literature on crowdfunding basically followed this trend and mostly assumed
that crowdfunding is operated under monopoly conditions (see, for example,
Belleamme et al (2014) or Miglo et al (2018)). However, much less is known
about the role of crowdfunding in explaning the behaviour of entrepreneurs
operating in competitve markets including cases when entrepreneurs who use
crowdfunding compete against entrepreneurs who do not.9 In this article we
shed some light on these questions. In particular, we argue that crowdfunding
can be used to signal the quality of a rms in the case when competitors have
private information about their product quality/demand.
We focus on reward-based crowdfunding (used by Indiegogo and Kickstarter-
the leading platforms in the area). In this case, investors count on some extra-
benets from the company such as future product discounts. In our model, a
rm decides whether or not to use crowdfunding for the pre-sale stage or just
use spot price sales. The crowdfunding campaign has the following features: 1)
no arbitrage condition: crowdfunding pre-sale price and spot price are equal;
2) the rm provides reward to funders; 3) the crowdfunding decision is publicly
observable.10
We rst demonstrate that in a monopoly setting, without making any ad-
ditional assumptions such as community benets to funders, crowdfunding is
5https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/public-goods-revolutionizing-household-products
3#/
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/kantala-handbags-inspired-by-traditional-artisans-
vegan#/
6https://artofthekickstart.com/kickstarter-vs-indiegogo-and-how-to-decide-for-your-
crowdfunding-campaign/
7https://www.verdict.co.uk/indiegogo-marketplace/
https://www.recode.net/2017/10/16/16474794/indiegogo-crowdfunding-commerce-
amazon
8https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/digital-farmers-market-aims-disrupt-duopoly-directly-
supporting
9https://www.verdict.co.uk/indiegogo-marketplace/
10The fact that the crowdfunding decision is well observed publicly given the nature of
crowdfunding where rms use public websites (platforms) makes crowdfunding di¤erent from
other pre-sale forms like forward sales for example. Although there is literature that argues
that the disclosure of these contracts would be desirable (see, among others, Hughes and
Kao, 1997, Allaz, 1992), this issue remains quite ambiguous. As another example note that
the development of a product within a private company that uses private nancing is not as
transparent as it is with crowdfunding etc.
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never used and rms prefer to just use the spot market since crowdfunding
involves a cost in the form of rewards. Then we consider a duopoly. When
information between rms is symmetric di¤erent equilibria can emerge. A sit-
uation where both duopolists do not use crowdfunding and only use the spot
market is not an equilibrium because each rm has an incentive to deviate and
use the crowdfunding campaign prior to its spot sales. Early committment of
this rm makes the product price lower, increases the production of this rm and
forces the other rm out of its optimal quantity and decreases prots compared
to the equilibrium situation. When information between rms is asymmetric,
we nd that the only signalling equilibrium that exists is when high-quality
(high demand) rms are likely to chose reward-based crowdfunding as a signal
of quality. Low-quality rms are less likely to mimick high-quality rms by chos-
ing crowdfunding, which implies more cost related to rewards, and prefer spot
sales exclusively instead. On the other hand an equilibrium where low-quality
rms select crowdfunding and high-quality rms do not does not exist. If the
uninformed competitor perceives the rm that uses a crowdfunding campaign
as a low-demand rm, it will be pessimistic about the price and will concede
the market. A high-demand rm can benet from this situation by mimicking
the strategy of low-demand rms during the crowdfunding stage.
David Mandelbrot, CEO of Indiegogo, noted the following: "The other trend
were seeing is more and more companies using Indiegogo as a way to engage with
their audience early. In the last year weve had campaigns from companies like
Procter and Gamble, Honeywell, and Bose. Theyre big, public companies....But
theyre using Indiegogo to validate the products coming out of their... divisions
and launch those products to an audience they can engage with directly."11 This
comment illustrates that good-quality rms are interested in using crowdfunding
for early engagements with customers versus just using the sport market for
sales, which is consistent with the spirit of the processes described in our model.
As was mentioned previously, the number of theoretical papers on crowd-
funding involving asymmetric information is relatively small. Note the following.
Belleamme et al (2014) compare reward-based and equity-based crowd-
funding. In either case, the funders enjoy community benets that increase
their utility. It is shown that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial
capital requirement is relatively small compared to the market size and prefers
prot sharing otherwise. Belleamme et al (2014) also o¤er some extensions
on the impact of quality uncertainty and information asymmetry but in these
extensions the choice between the di¤erent forms of crowdfunding and other
forms of nancing is not modelled. As the authors mentioned, further research
is required.
Miglo et al (2018) consider the choice between the di¤erent types of crowd-
funding and traditional nancing under di¤erent types of market imperfections.
In contrast to most existing literature they focus on nancial aspects of crowd-
funding rather than on price discrimination between customers using a new
11https://venturebeat.com/2018/01/15/indiegogo-moves-beyond-crowdfunding-to-help-
startups-with-manufacturing/
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approach on the demand side. It was found that when asymmetric information
is important, high-quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. A low-
quality rm may nd it unprotable to mimick this strategy as it will be taking
more risk to achieve a threshold. This result is contradictory to the spirit of the
results in Belleamme et al (2014), which nds that asymmetric information
favours equity-based crowdfunding. In contrast to Belleamme et al (2014), in
this model, crowdfunding does not have any ad-hoc non-monetary benets.
Chakraborty and Swinney (2017) consider a crowdfunding model where
product quality is known to the entrepreneur but not to some contributors.
They nd that a larger campaign target can be used by high quality rms as a
signalling device. Miglo et al (2018) nd that the relationship between a rms
quality and the campaign goal is non-linear. More specically they argue that
the threshold should neither be very low or very high. To some extent it is con-
sistent with the spirit of the results in some papers in that higher targets do not
necessarily signal a better quality. For example, Mollick (2015) and Cordova et
al (2015) found that setting higher thresholds does not lead to higher campaign
success rates.
Miglo (2018) considers a model of the choice between the di¤erent types of
crowdfunding, which contains elements of the asymmetric information approach
and behavioral nance (overcondent entrepreneurs). The model provides sev-
eral implications, most of which have not yet been tested. The model predicts
that high-quality rms may use equity-based crowdfunding in equilibrium which
contrasts the traditional results (for example pecking-order theory) where equity
represents an inferior security. The latter has rational managers. It also con-
trasts traditional behavioral nance literature (for example, Fairchild (2007))
where equity is dominated by other kinds of nancing.
None of these papers analyze crowdfunding in a duopoly setting. Some com-
mon features and ideas which we share are that under perfect information and
without introducing any additional assumptions in the model, the Modigliani-
Miller proposition usually holds, i.e all methods of nancing (including crowd-
funding) bring the same result. Under asymmetric information, di¤erent equi-
libria may exist where crowdfunding may play a role. Miglo (2018) is probably
the closest one to the spirit of our result in that in this paper equity-based
crowdfunding is a longer-term phenomenon compared to reward-based crowd-
funding (since under equity-based crowdfunding funders are long-term investors)
and hence, the roles of information asymmetry and information revelation are
di¤erent for di¤erent types of crowdfunding. It is similar to our model where
crowdfunding is a longer-term process (in our case because of the earlier commit-
ment by the rm) than just spot sales. In both papers the process of revealing
information is longer and in some sense more interesting (because the results
from earlier stages of the game a¤ect the outcome in later stages) for longer-term
method of nancing: crowdfunding in our paper and equity-based crowdfunding
in the other paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model and its results for the symmetric as well as asymmetric information cases.
Section 3 discusses the models predictions. Section 4 discusses the models
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robustness and its potential extensions and Section 5 is a conclusion to the
study.
2 The Model
We begin by considering a traditional framework where an entrepreneurial rm
has monopoly power over its product or service. The production is q. The
rm trades on the spot market (the price is p = a   q) and (prior to that) it
can use a crowdfunding campaign.12 Let c and s denote crowdfunding pre-sales
and spot sales respectively: q = c + s. We consider a non-arbitrage situation
where the pre-sale (crowdfunding) price equals p. If a rm uses crowdfunding,
the funders (those who pre-order the product during the pre-sale/crowdfunding
stage) expect to receive an extra-benet (reward)  from the rm.13 So the
total cost of these benets for the rm equals c. We assume that  is just
large enough to compensate funders for the waiting time between the pre-sale
stage and the actual sale of the product so the non-arbitrage condition holds.
The rm maximizes its prot  = pq   c.
When selecting s, the rm maximizes (a  c  s)s.
The solution is:
s =
a  c
2
(1)
Also
p = a  c  s = a  c
2
When selecting c, the rm maximizes p(c+s) c = a c2 a+c2  c. The solution
is
c = 0 (2)
Lemma 1. Under monopoly situation, crowdfunding is not used.
Exisitng literature incorporates di¤erent additonal crowdfunding features to
explain their usage. Some examples include ad-hoc non-monetary benets as in
Belleamme et al (2014), di¤erent market imperfections as in Miglo et al (2018),
uncertainty about the demand function as in Strausz (2017) and Chemla et al
(2017) etc. Note, however, that none of these theoretical papers have ultimate
empirical support especially in terms of the assumptions made. Also all of them
need to make a lot of extra assumptions to explain the non-arbitrage condition
12 In Section 4 we discuss the models robustness with regard to di¤erent assumptions in-
cluding, for example, demand function.
13 It may include discounts on the rms products/services, early access to some of its ser-
vices, exclusive access to some services etc. Also note that there exist two types of reward-
based crowdfunding. The Keep-It-All (KIA) model involves setting a fundraising goal and
keeping the entire amount raised, regardless of whether or not they meet their goal. The All-
Or-Nothing(AON) model involves setting a fundraising goal and keeping nothing unless the
goal is achieved. In this article we do not focus on the di¤erence between AON and KIA since
asymmetric information is related to the relationship between competitors and not between
the rm and the funders (the latter is the focus in Miglo et al (2018) and Belleamme et al
(2014)).
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between the pre-sale (crowdfunding) price and the spot price. In our case we
do not have same problem, the arbitrage condition holds automatically, we do
not have any supplementary questionable empirically assumptions and hence
we can focus on competitve market analysis and the crowdfunding role in this
market.
Now consider a standard duopoly situation: there are two rms producing
and trading the same product/service. The production of Firm 1 is q1 and that
of Firm 2 is q2. Let ci and si denote crowdfunding pre-sales and spot sales
respectively for Firm i, i 2 1; 2: qi = ci + si. The spot price of the good is
p = a   q1   q2. Firm 1 has an informational advantage on its rival: it has
private knowledge of the demand parameter a. Firms decide whether to use
crowdfunding (this strategy will be denoted CF) or not (S). This decision is
publicly observable. If a rm decides to not use crowdfunding, it will only sell
on the spot market. Firms maximize their prots i = pqi   ci, i 2 1; 2.
2.1 Symmetric information case
Suppose that both rms are equally informed, i.e. a is common knowledge. The
sequence of events in the game is as follows.
1. Firms decide whether or not to use crowdfunding.
2. Firms observe each other decision.
3. Firms determine ci. (ci = 0 if the rm does not use crowdfunding).
4. Firms determine si.
In stage 1 the following situations can occur: both rms select S; both rms
select CF; Firm 1 selects CF and Firm 2 selects S; Firm 2 selects CF and Firm
1 uses S. We use the Nash equilibrium concept. An equilibrium is dened as a
situation where no rm has an incentive to deviate. If both rms select S, the
equilibrium outcome is s1 = s2 = a=3 and 1 = 2 = a2=9. Indeed Firm 1
chooses s1 to maximize s1(a  s1   s2), which makes:
s1 =
a  s2
2
(3)
Similarly for Firm 2 we get
s2 =
a  s1
2
(4)
Solving (3) and (4) produces
si =
a
3
(5)
Also
p = a  s1   s2 = a
3
(6)
i =
a2
9
(7)
Now consider a situation where both rms select CF. We begin the solution
of this case by backwards. On the spot market, Firm 1 chooses s1 to maximize
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s1(a  s1   s2   c1   c2), which makes:
s1 =
a  s2   c1   c2
2
(8)
Similarly for Firm 2 we get
s2 =
a  s1   c1   c2
2
(9)
Solving (8) and (9) produces
si =
a  c1   c2
3
(10)
During crowdfunding Firm 1 maximizes (s1 + c1)(a   s1   s2   c1   c2)   c1
subject (10). This gives us:
c1 =
a  c2   9
4
Similarly for Firm 2:
c2 =
a  c1   9
4
It implies:
ci =
a  9
5
(11)
(10) and (11) imply that the price equals
p =
a+ 6
5
(12)
The rms prot equals then
i =
2a2 + 2a   92
25
(13)
Now consider a situation where one rm (for instance, Firm 1) selects CF
and the other one selects S. In this case c2 = 0.
Since c2 = 0, (10) implies:
s1 = s2 = p =
a  c1
3
1 = (c1 +
a  c1
3
)
a  c1
3
  c1 = (a+ 2c1)(a  c1)
9
  c1 (14)
Firm 2 prot equals
2 = s2p =
(a  c1)2
9
Optimal c1 that maximizes Firm 1 expected prot (given by (14)) equals
c1 =
a  9
4
(15)
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Accordingly we have 2 =
(a+3)2
16 and 1 =
a2 2a+92
8 .
Note that if  is su¢ ciently small, not using crowdfunding makes Firm 2
worse o¤ compared to the case (S,S). Early committment of Firm 1 makes the
product price lower, increases the production of Firm 1 and forces Firm 2 out
of its optimal quantity.
The matrix of payo¤s for the di¤erent cases is shown in Figure 1.
Firm 1/Firm 2 S CF
S a
2
9 ;
a2
9
(a+3)2
16 ;
a2 2a+92
8
CF a
2 2a+92
8 ;
(a+3)2
16
2a2+2a 92
25 ;
2a2+2a 92
25
Figure 1. Matrix of payo¤s.
Proposition 1. (S,S) is not an equilibrium.
Proof. Indeed consider the situation where both rms select S. Suppose that
Firm 1 decides to use crowdfunding. We have:
a2   2a + 152
8
>
a2
9
So (S,S) is not an equilibrium. Firms have an incentive to use crowdfunding and
force the second rm out of the market to some extent. Note that if  is small
neither of the 3 possible equilibria are Pareto improving compared to (S,S). And
(CF,CF) makes both rms worse o¤compared to (S,S). If crowdfunding destroys
social surplus should the government prohibit it? The next section considers
the case of asymmetric information between rms and sheds more lights on the
role of crowdfunding.
2.2 Asymmetric information
Suppose that there are two types of Firm 1: a = ah for type h and a = al for
type l, where ah > al (further subscript h/l indicates that the rm is type h/l).
Firm 1 knows the value of a while Firm 2 does not so rm 2 tries to gure it
out from the actions undertaken by Firm 1.14 Then for each type of Firm 1
we have a di¤erent payo¤ matrix depending on the value of a. An equilibrium
is a situation where no type has an incentive to deviate. It is characterized
by actions (strategies) undertaken by each type of Firm 1, the beliefs of Firm
2 about Firm 1s type after observing di¤erent actions (on equilibrium path
and o¤-equilibrium path) and actions undertaken by Firm 2. We focus on
separating equilibria which help to generate predictions about the signalling
power of crowdfunding. It is an equilibrium where di¤erent types of Firm 1
select di¤erent strategies. Two possible separating equilibria may exist. One
14Asymmetric information between rms and consumers (in a monopolistic setting) is stud-
ied in Belleamme et al (2014) and Miglo et al (2018). In a competitve setting this represents
an interesting direction for future research.
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where type l uses crowdfunding and type h does not and another where type h
uses it and l does not.
Proposition 2. A separating equilibrium exists where type h selects CF
and type l selects S. A separating equilibrium where type l selects CF and type
h selects S does not exist.
Proof. First consider the case  = 0. The matrix of payo¤s for the case of
perfect information for each type of Firm 1 is as follows.
Firm 1/Firm 2 S CF
S a
2
l
9 ;
a2l
9
a2l
16 ;
a2l
8
CF a
2
l
8 ;
a2l
16
2a2l
25 ;
2a2l
25
Figure 2a. Matrix of payo¤s for type l when  = 0.
Firm 1/Firm 2 S CF
S a
2
h
9 ;
a2h
9
a2h
16 ;
a2h
8
CF a
2
h
8 ;
a2h
16
2a2h
25 ;
2a2h
25
Figure 2b. Matrix of payo¤s for type h when  = 0.
The candidate for a separating equilibrium is the case where Firm 2 selects
CF and di¤erent types of Firm 1 select di¤erent strategies. The situation where
Firm 2 selects S can not be an equilibrium. As follows from Figure 2, Firm 2
would deviate to CF. So we consider a situation where Firm 2 selects CF and
Firm 1 selects CF if it has type l and selects S otherwise. Firm 2 believes that
the type is l when observing CF and h when observing S. From Figure 2 the
payo¤s of each type are
1l =
2a2l
25
(16)
1h =
a2h
16
(17)
where 1j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on the
symmetric information case for each type described in the previous section).
Suppose that h mimics l and uses crowdfunding. (11) implies
c2 =
al
5
s2 =
al
5
Firm h chooses s1 to maximize s1(ah   s1   s2   c1   c2). Solving for s1
s1 =
5ah   3al
10
p =
5ah   3al
10
9
1h =
(5ah   al)(5ah   3al)
100
Comparing this with (17) we nd that this is smaller if
al(
8
15
  2
p
7
15
) < ah < al(
8
15
+
2
p
7
15
) (18)
The right side of this condition does not hold since it is smaller than al but
ah  al. So this equilibrium does not exist. If Firm 2 perceives a rm that uses
a crowdfunding campaign as a low demand rm, it will be pessimistic about the
price and will concede the market. Type h can benet from this situation by
mimicking the strategy of type l during the crowdfunding stage.
Now consider an equilibrium where type h uses crowdfunding and l does not.
The equilibriums payo¤s are:
1h =
2a2h
25
(19)
1l =
a2l
16
(20)
Suppose that h mimics l and does not use crowdfunding. (15) implies:
c2 =
al
4
s2 =
al
4
h maximizes its prot: (ah   al4   al4   s1)s1. Solving for s1
s1 =
2ah   al
4
p =
2ah   al
4
1h =
(2ah   al)2
16
Comparing this with (19) we nd that this is smaller if
25  10p2
34
al < ah <
25 + 10
p
2
34
al (21)
.
Suppose that l mimics h and does use crowdfunding. (11) implies
c2 =
ah
5
s2 =
ah
5
10
Firm l chooses s1 to maximize s1(al   s1   s2   c1   c2). Solving for s1
s1 =
5al   3ah
10
p =
5al   3ah
10
1l =
(5al   ah)(5al   3ah)
100
Comparing this with (20) we nd that this is smaller if
(4 p7)5al
6
< ah <
(4 +
p
7)5al
6
(22)
.
Note that the conditions (21) and (22) can hold simultaneously because
(4 p7)5
6 <
25+10
p
2
34 .
Therefore an equilibrium where type h uses crowdfunding (and sells c1h =
ah=5) and l does not (and sells c1l = 0) may exist.
The case with  > 0 is considered in the Appendix.
The main result of Proposition 2 is that the only signalling equilibrium that
can exist is when the high-demand type selects crowdfunding.
3 Implications
Our paper has several implications for an entrepreneurial rms choice of crowd-
funding.
Proposition 1 explains the value of crowdfunding for rms. Under monopoly,
crowdfunding is not used. If the non-argbitrage condition holds, the rm should
compensate buyers for waiting by o¤ering rewards, which makes crowdfunding
a more expensive option. However in the case of a duopoly rms may select
crowdfunding in favor of just spot price sales. A situation where both rms
do not use crowdfunding is never an equilibrium. Firms have an incentive to
use crowdfunding that forces the second rm out of the market to some extent.
Early committment from one rm by using crowdfunding makes the product
price lower, increases the production of this rm and forces the other rm out
of its optimal quantity.
Proposition 2 implies that high-quality rms can use crowdfunding to signal
their quality. If an uninformed rm perceives a rm that uses a crowdfunding
campaign as being a low-demand rm, it will be pessimistic about the price and
will concede the market. A high-quality rm can benet from this situation
by mimicking the strategy of low-quality rms during the crowdfunding stage.
So an equilibrium where the low-demand rm uses crowdfunding and the high-
demand rm does not use it does not exist. However, as we show the opposite is
true and an equilibrium where a high-demand rm uses crowdfunding can exist.
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Competition is high because rm 2 perceives crowdufnding as being a high-
demand product with high prices so rm 2 also increases its production, which
implies that a low quality rm will not mimick this strategy. This prediction
has not been directly tested but is consistent with the spirit of the results found
in Ahlers, Cumming, Guenther, and Schweizer (2015), Cumming, Leboeuf and
Schwienbacher (2014) and Mollick (2014) (the rms nancing choice can serve
as a signal of a projects quality).15
4 The Model Extensions And Robustness
Di¤erent demand functions. Our focus in this article is to analyze the role of
asymmetric information in crowdfunding. That is why we adopt a relatively
simple demand function. In dynamic monopoly pricing literature this approach
is not unusual (see, for example, Demichelis and Tarola (2006)). The intuitions
behind our results (such as Propositions 1, 2) is general enough and will hold
if mathematically di¤erent demand functions are used. Alternatively, a sigi-
cantly di¤erent approach of modelling the demand side can be taken where
individual customers with di¤erent demand functions are included (see, for ex-
ample, Belleamme et al (2014) and Strausz (2017)). This approach is often
used in industrial organization or price discrimination literature. Our focus is
on asymmetric information between competitors and the approach that uses
total demand functions from investors/funders (the market) is very common.
Below we analyze a setting with individual demands and show that the basic
idea holds.
An entrepreneurial rm has monopoly power over its product or service. The
production is q. A potential consumers surplus from buying the product is v p,
where p is the price and v is the consumers product valuation. Each consumer
only needs one unit of the product/service. The valuation from consuming an
extra-unit is zero. Consumers buy/order the product/service as long as they
have a non-negative surplus v p, where p is the price. v is uniformly distributed
between 0 and a. The rm trades on the spot market and (prior to that) it
can use a crowdfunding campaign. Let c and s denote crowdfunding pre-sales
and spot sales respectively: q = c + s. We consider a non-arbitrage situation
where the pre-sale (crowdfunding) price equals p. If a rm uses crowdfunding,
the funders (those who pre-order the product during the pre-sale/crowdfunding
stage) expect to receive an extra-benet (reward)  from the rm,   a. So
the total cost of these benets for the rm equals c. We assume that  is
just large enough to compensate the funders for the waiting time between the
pre-sale stage and the actual sale of the product so the non-arbitrage condition
holds. The rm maximizes its prot  = pq   c. Also we assume that if a
consumer is indi¤erent between buying during crowdfunding and spot selling,
they will split randomly between periods.
15See, for example:
http://crowdfunding.cmf-fmc.ca/facts_and_stats/how-likely-is-your-crowdfunding-
campaign-to-succeed
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Suppose the price is p. All buyers with v  p are interested in buying the
product. By assumption 50% of them will be buying during crowdfunding and
50% during pre-sale. Since they are randomly split, the rms prot equals:
pa p2    a p2 + pa p2 = p(a  p)   a p2 . The optimal price is p = a+=22 . The
rms prot is
a+ =2
2
(a  a+ =2
2
)   a  =2
4
=
a2
4
+
2
16
  a
4
(23)
If the rm does not use crowdfunding all consumers with v  p will buy the
product on the spot market. The rms prot equals p(a p). The optimal price
is p = a2 . The rms prot is
a
2 (a  a2 ) = a
2
4 . This is greater than (23). So the
rm should not use crowdfunding which is consistent with Lemma 1.
Now consider a duopoly. We assume that if there is more than one rm
o¤ering the same price, consumers will be split randomly. Suppose that both
rms do not use crowdfunding. By assumption 50% of them will be from Firm
1 and 50% from Firm 2. Since they are randomly split, each rms prot equals
pa p2 . The optimal price is p =
a
2 . The rms prot is
a
2
(
a  a2
2
) =
a2
8
(24)
Now suppose that one rm deviates and uses crowdfunding (for example,
Firm 1). By assumption 50% of consumers will buy the product during crowd-
funding and 50% during spot market sale. Firm 1s prot equals: a2
3a
8    a4 =
3
16a
2    a4 . This greater than (24). So an equilibrium where both rms do not
use crowdfunding does not exist.
Now consider the case where only one rm uses crowdfunding (for example,
Firm 1). By assumption 50% of consumers will be buying the product during
crowdfunding and 50% during spot market sale. Firm 1s prot equals: p 3(a p)4  
 a p2 . The optimal price is p =
3a
4 +

2
3
2
. The rms prot is a+=22 (a  a+=22 ) 
 a =24 . The other rm prot is
3a
4 +

2
3
2
(a p)
4 .
Now consider the case where both rms use crowdfunding. By assumption
50% of consumers will be buying the product during crowdfunding and 50%
during spot market sale. The rms prot equals: pa p4    a p4 + pa p4 =
p(a p)
2    a p4 . The optimal price is p = a+=22 . The rms prot is
a+ =2
2
(
a
2
  a+ =2
4
)   a  =2
8
=
a2
8
+
2
32
  a
8
(25)
Now suppose that one rm deviates and does not use crowdfunding (for ex-
ample, Firm 1). By assumption 50% of consumers will buy the product dur-
ing crowdfunding and 50% during spot market sale. Firm 1s prot equals:
a+=2
2 (a   a+=22 )=4 = a
2
16   
2
64 . This is smaller than (25). So an equilibrium
where both rms use crowdfunding does exist, which is consistent with Propo-
sition 1.
13
Changing the value of the reward. One of the assumption of our analysis is
that the reward is just high enough to comensate buyers for waiting. Di¤erent
concepts can instead be used. One should note however that without any ad-
ditional assumptions ours is the simplest approach such that the non-arbitrage
condition holds, which is one of the crucial assumptions when modelling con-
sumers behavior and demand. Di¤erent papers make di¤erent assumptions in
order to model rewards, for example in Belleamme et al (2014) there are ad-hoc
community benets related to crowdfunding which creates a di¤erence between
the pre-sale price and the spot price; in Chemla et al (2017) a risk exists that
the rm will not make some intermediate investment required to produce the
product between the crowdfunding stage and actual sales so the crowdfunding
price can be lower than spot price because of moral hazard and risk problems
for funders etc.
The distribution of types. In the sections that deal with asymmetric infor-
mation we use two types of rms to illustrate the main ideas. This is also very
typical in literature. A natural question though is whether the results stand
if one considers a case with multiple types. Our analysis shows16 that most
conclusions remain the same: under asymmetric information, crowdfunding is a
signal of quality compared to spot sales. In the case of multple types, however,
an equilibrium may exist where only the type with the lowest demand (speak-
ing about Proposition 2 when  = 0) will be indi¤erent between crowdfunding
and spot sales and every other type selects crowdfunding. When  > 0, our
analysis shows that the results may hold even in a multiple types environment
though more research is required. The main implication of our analysis holds.
In particular, our results show that there is no semi-separating equlibrium where
the average quality of types that choose crowdfunding is lower than those that
choose spot sales, which is consistent with our basic model.
Di¤erent types of crowdfunding. Unlike capital structure literature, where
debt/equity mix is a very common strategy (as opposed to pure equity or pure
debt nancing), in our paper rms decide whether or not to use crowwdfunding.
So mixing these two decisions makes no sense. Further extensions however are
possible where rms consider di¤erent types of crowdfunding including equity-
based, debt-based crowdfunding, etc.. Most resutls regarding the costs and
benets of di¤erent nancing strategies found in this paper are quite general
and do not depend on the introduction of more options in the model. Quan-
titatively though, some conditions may change. It is denitely an interesting
direction for future research. Note that most existing theoretical literature on
crowdfunding does often consider reward-based and equity-based crowdfunding
separately from debt-based crowdfunding. One of the reasons for this seems to
be that the foundersobjectives are quite di¤erent in these scenarios (see, for
example, Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014)).
16Proofs are available upon demand. Note that the calculations become much longer and
technically more complicated, which is very typical for multiple types games with asymmetric
information.
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5 Conclusions
Traditionally crowdfunding was used for funding highly innovative projects
where rms retain monopoly power during the development and sales of the
product. Recently, however, companies began to use crowdfunding for nanc-
ing more traditional products and services where they compete against other
sellers of similar products. This paper o¤ers a model of a duopoly where rms
can use crowdfunding prior to direct sales. The model is based on asymmetric
information between competitors regarding the demand for the product. It pro-
vides several implications that have not yet been tested. For example we nd
that high-demand rms can use crowdfunding to signal their quality.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 case  > 0. Consider an equilibrium where type h
uses crowdfunding and l does not. The equilibriums payo¤s are:
1h =
2a2h + 2ah   92
25
(26)
1l =
(al + 3)
2
16
(27)
where 1j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on the
symmetric information case for each type described in the previous section).
Suppose that h mimics l and does not use crowdfunding. (11) implies
c2 =
al   9
4
s2 =
al   9
4
(ah   al 94   al 94   s1)s1. Solving for s1
s1 =
2ah   al + 9
4
p =
2ah   al + 9
4
1h =
(2ah   al + 9)2
16
16
Comparing this with (26) we nd that this is smaller if
25al
34
 217
34
 100
34
s
a2l
50
  al
25
+
434172
10000
< ah <
25al
34
 217
34
+
100
34
s
a2l
50
  al
25
+
434172
10000
(28)
Suppose that l mimics h and does use crowdfunding. (11) implies
c2 =
ah   9
5
s2 =
ah + 6
5
Since l pretends to be h, it chooses c1 = c2 =
ah 9
5 . Also rm l chooses s1 to
maximize s1(al   s1   s2   c1   c2). Solving for s1
s1 =
5al   3ah + 12
10
p =
5al   3ah + 12
10
1l =
(5al   ah   6)(5al   3ah + 12)
100
Comparing this with (27) we nd that this is smaller if
10al
3
  50
3
r
7a2l
400
  3al
200
+
315
2000
2 < ah <
10al
3
 +50
3
r
7a2l
400
  3al
200
+
315
2000
2
(29)
The rst part of the proposition follows from the case  = 0 and the continuity
of conditions (28) and (29) with regard to . Since an equilibrium exists when
 = 0, it also exists when  is su¢ ciently small.
Now consider a situation where type l uses crowdfunding and h does not.
The payo¤s of each type
1l =
2a2l + 2al   92
25
(30)
1h =
(ah + 3)
2
16
(31)
where 1j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on the
symmetric information case for each type described in the previous section).
Suppose that h mimics l and does use crowdfunding. (11) implies
c2 =
al   9
5
s2 =
al + 6
5
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Since h pretends to be l, it chooses c1 = c2 =
al 9
5 . Also rm h chooses s1 to
maximize s1(ah   s1   s2   c1   c2). Solving for s1
s1 =
5ah   3al + 12
10
p =
5ah   3al + 12
10
1h =
(5ah   al   6)(5ah   3al + 12)
100
Comparing this with (31) we nd that this is smaller if
8al
15
+

5
 8
3
r
7a2l
400
  3al
200
+
1548
1600
2 < ah <
8al
15
+

5
+
8
3
r
7a2l
400
  3al
200
+
1548
1600
2
(32)
If  is su¢ ciently small, the right side of this inequality does not hold.
Suppose that l mimics h and does not use crowdfunding. (11) implies
c2 =
ah   9
4
s2 =
ah   9
4
When chosing s1, Firm 1 maximizes (al  ah 94   ah 94   s1)s1. Solving for s1
s1 =
2al   ah + 9
4
p =
2al   ah + 9
4
1l =
(2al   ah + 9)2
16
Comparing this with (30) we nd that this is smaller if
2al + 9   8
s
a2l
50
+
al
50
  9
2
100
< ah < 2al + 9 + 8
s
a2l
50
+
al
50
  9
2
100
(33)
The second part of the proposition follows from the case  = 0 and the
numerical analysis of conditions (32) and (33). The following pictures present a
graphical illustration of the above conditions for di¤erent values of  (horizontal
axes is al, vertical axes is ah).
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We see that the zone where both non-mimicking conditions intersect does
not exist for cases  = 0:01,  = 0:02,  = 0:05,  = 0:1 and  = 0:15 so they
cannot hold simultaneously. Furthermore, with a higher  these areas become
farther away. For cases  = 0,  = 0:001 and  = 0:005 these areas do intersect
(or can intersect) however it happens in the non-feasible area where ah (vertical
axis) is less than al (horizontal axis). The latter is consistent with the case
 = 0 described in the main text.
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